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Abstract
This paper adds to the growing literature on stochastic evolutionary models. These
models can be characterised by small probability shocks or mutations which perturb the system
away from its deterministic evolution, allowing it to move between equilibria over a long
period of time. Much of the literature has concentrated on the result that, in the limit as the
mutation rate approaches zero, the stationary distribution becomes concentrated on the risk-
dominant equilibrium because it is easier to flow into. However, it has been shown that in
models of local interaction, allowing player movement eases the flow into the efficient
equilibrium. This paper looks at the consequences of such player movement when there are
capacity constraints which limit the number of agents who can reside at each location. The
system may then settle into a mixed state in which different locations coordinate on different
equilibria.
JEL classification numbers: C72, C73, D83.
Keywords: Evolution, Local Interaction, Equilibrium Selection.
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21. Introduction
How do players know which equilibrium to play when a game has multiple equilibria?
This question has been at the heart of much research in game theory. The focus of attention
has been the 2x2 Coordination Game such as the one given in figure 1.1 that has two Nash
equilibria in pure strategies, one of which is Pareto-efficient but is riskier to play than the
other. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) call the former equilibrium payoff-dominant and the latter
risk-dominant. Schelling (1960) appeals to the prominence of efficiency to suggest that agents
will play for the payoff-dominant equilibrium in the expectation that other agents will be
similarly attracted by its focal status. But Harsanyi and Selten have emphasised that such an
expectation may not be well-founded. If each player optimises on the assumption that the
opponent is equally likely to play either strategy, the outcome will be the risk-dominant
equilibrium of the game, which therefore also has a focal status that may outweigh that of the
payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Evolutionary game theory has given the argument another perspective. By modelling
the process by which agents adjust their strategies out of equilibrium we can analyse how it is
that one equilibrium strategy rather than another may be selected. The principle underlying the
dynamic systems studied in evolutionary game theory is that successful strategies will be used
by a greater proportion of the population in future periods.
To illustrate the idea consider the Coordination Game of figure 1.1. The game has two
pure-strategy equilibria, e1 = (s1, s1) and e2 = (s2, s2). Notice that e1 is payoff-dominant while
e2 is risk-dominant. There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium where s1 is played with
probability 2/3. When expressed in terms of the fraction q of the population using strategy s1,
these Nash equilibria correspond respectively to q=1, q=0 and q=2/3. We begin by studying a
3specific dynamic system for which the population states q=1 and q=0 are stable stationary
points. Denote these stationary states by E1 and E2 respectively.
        s1             s2
s1     5,5     0,3
s2     3,0     4,4
Figure 1.1
2x2 Coordination Game
Assume that members of the population are randomly matched each period to play this
game. They adjust their choice by playing the strategy that yielded the highest expected payoff
in the previous period when they are given the chance to do so. Now consider the case where
q>2/3. If a revision opportunity arises, then the optimal response against the current state is to
play s1. The proportion playing s1 will therefore grow over time until the state where everyone
plays s1 is reached. The basin of attraction of E1 is therefore (2/3, 1], since it will be selected
from any state where q>2/3. Similarly the basin of attraction of E2, where everyone plays s2, i
[0, 2/3). A third possible stationary state (provided the population size N is infinite) is q = 2/3.
At this point, no agent has an incentive to change his strategy. However, only E1 and E2 are
locally stable.
Kandori et al (1993) and Young (1993) added to this analysis by assuming that agents
sometimes “mutate” by changing their strategies at random. Each agent has a positive probability
of mutating each period. There is therefore a small but positive probability that there will be a
large number of simultaneous mutations. Once in an equilibrium, it is therefore no longer the
case that the system will stay there forever because enough simultaneous mutations will
eventually occur to move the system into the other basin of attraction. The system therefore
4needs to be described in terms of a probability distribution over the states, with much of the
time spent in or close to the two stable states when the mutation rate is small.
Kandori et al show that, when the probability of mutation goes to zero, the distribution
becomes concentrated entirely on the risk-dominant equilibrium, E2. The eason for this is that
more mutations are required to move from E2 to E1 than from E1 to E2. As the mutation rate
goes to zero the probability of the first transition becomes negligible compared with the
second. The time-limit of the distribution over population states therefore puts all its mass on
E2 when the mutation rate becomes vanishingly small. Following Kandori et al, equilib a that
have a positive probability as the mutation rate goes to zero will be called long-run equilibria.
A criticism of this model is the huge expected waiting time to move from E1 to the
long-run equilibrium E2 when the population size is large. If the system is in E1 and the
mutation rate is very small, then although it is true that the stationary distribution will be
concentrated on E2, it is likely to be a very long time before there are enough simultaneous
mutations to move the system out of the basin of attraction of E1. Ellison (1993) introduces a
local interaction structure which dramatically reduces waiting times whilst maintaining the
result that the state where everyone plays the risk-dominant strategy is the unique long-run
equilibrium. In his model, players are located around a circle and interact only with a subset of
the population who are close to them. He shows that a small number of mutations
concentrated together may be enough to upset the payoff-dominant equilibrium1.
                                         
1 Suppose for example that each agent only interacts with the four closest players or neighbours either side of
him and they are randomly matched with these neighbours to play the game in figure 1.1. Then each player
has 8 neighbours and if at least 3 of them play s2 then the best response is to play s2. Now consider the state in
which everyone plays s1. If there are 4 neighbours who simultaneously mutate then they each have 3
neighbours who are playing s2 and they will therefore continue to play s2. There are now another 4 players who
are currently playing s1 but have at least 3 neighbours playing s2. They will revise their strategies when given
the chance and in this way the strategy s2 will spread throughout the population. Four well placed mutations
are enough to move the system into the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium and so the
expected waiting time is much smaller and independent of the population size.
5Although the overwhelming consensus of this literature is that the risk-dominant
equilibrium E2 will be selected, this is not always the case when local interaction is modelled.
In Kandori et al, the location structure does not matter since each agent is equally likely to be
matched with every other agent in the population. In models of local interaction, agents are
more likely to be matched with neighbouring players. An agent’s choice of location is therefore
important, since this will determine his or her expected payoff. Thus, if agents are given the
chance, they will move to the location where they get the highest expected payoff. In Ellison’s
model, however, this phenomenon is absent, since agents are located at fixed p sitions around
a circle and remain there. If this assumption is relaxed, a few mutations need no longer be
enough to upset the payoff-dominant equilibrium because agents may move away from a
locality in which deviant mutations have occurred in search of a higher payoff. Similarly, the
risk-dominant equilibrium may now be easier to upset since a few localised mutations may
entice movement towards this locality. Ely (1995) presents a model based on this idea in which
such movement makes the long-run equilibrium E1 rather than E2.
However, movement between locations is sometimes restricted by capacity constraints
that limit the number of people that can reside at each location. These constraints may arise
from physical aspects of the locations or may be imposed by local governance. For example,
there may be a certain number of slots at each location, limiting the number that can play
there. Alternatively, one can imagine neighbouring societies who impose restrictions on the
maximum number of inhabitants. Once this limit is reached, further immigration is prohibited.
Such constraints may be imposed when there is a negative payoff to congestion.
We investigate the consequences of such constraints in a model where agents can
move between two locations or islands. While a location is not full to capacity, agents can
move freely to and from it. However, no one can move to a location that is full to its capacity.
6We begin by analysing the case where strategy2 revision is instantaneous, i.e. everybody
revises their strategy each period, but the chance to move to another location only arises with
some positive probability. It is shown that there is a range of parameter values for which the
long-run equilibria involve one island playing the efficient equilibrium and the other playing the
risk-dominant one with the first island full to capacity.
In section 2.2 we show that the results hold when there is inertia in strategy revision.
Since one of the interpretations of the model is that capacity constraints may be imposed to
limit congestion, we introduce a congestion effect in section 2.3 and show the results of the
previous two sections still hold. Finally, section 2.4 looks at the consequences of relaxing the
capacity constraints altogether. As in Ely (1995), the efficient equilibria are then favoured.
                                         
2 A strategy is simply a choice between s1 and s2 and does not include location.
7Section 2.
In this section, we present a model of local interaction with movement between
locations. We assume that there are two islands and agents are randomly matched with
someone on the same island to play the game of figure 2.1 in which A>C, D>B, A>D and
A+B<C+D. Hence e1=(s1, s1) is the payoff-dominant equilibrium while e2 =(s2, s2) is risk-
dominant. The probability with which s1 is played in the mixed-strategy equilibrium is q* = (D-
B)/(A-C+D-B) > 1/2.
                                                    s1                s2
                s1    A, A    B, C
                s2    C, B    D, D
Figure 2.1
Each period some agents are given the chance to move islands. We begin by looking at the
case where strategy revision on each island is instantaneous. The analysis is then extended to
the case where there is inertia in strategy revision. We then show that the results hold when
there is a congestion effect. Finally, we look at the consequences of removing the capacity
constraints.
2.1 Basic Model
Players are randomly matched on each of two isolated islands to play the game of
figure 2.1. The global population is 2N and the capacity of each island is (1+d)N. Strategy
revision is instantaneous, that is everybody chooses a strategy that is a best response to the
state in the previous period. The chance to change islands arises with a positive probability
each period. When such an opportunity arises, the agent will choose the location and strategy
that would have maximised their expected payoff in the previous period. If the agent is
indifferent between two choices then we assume they choose either with a positive probability.
8However, an agent cannot move to an island that is full to capacity. If the number of agents
who wish to move to island i is greater than (N(1+d)-ni), where ni is the current number on the
island, then only (N(1+d)-ni) of them will be allowed to move. N is sufficiently large that the
following set of numbers are all integers, {N(1-d), N(1+d), q*N, (1+d)q*N, (1-d)q*N, (1-
d)(1-q*)N, (1+d)(1-q*)N}. One can think of the following story underlying these dynamics.
At the end of each period players gather information on the proportion of the population using
each strategy on their island. With some positive probability, they also learn the proportions
on the other island. At the beginning of the next period they choose a location and strategy to
use for that period. If they have no information about the other island then they stay where
they are and choose the strategy that is a best reply to the proportions in the previous period.
If they do learn the proportions on the other island then they will want to move if a best reply
on the other island yields a higher expected payoff. If the island has spare capacity they will
move and play the best reply. If it is full then they play a best reply on their current island.
The state space is
S
n
n
n
N n
n n n N n N d n N d=
-
Î Î - - £ £ +{( , ): ( , ,..., ), ( , ,..., ), ( ) ( )}1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1 2
1
1 12
01 01 2 1 1 ,
where ni
1 is the number playing strategy s1 on island i and n1 is the number of agents on island
1. Denote a state of the system by s=(q1 ,q2 ,n1)ÎS, where qi is the proportion of the
population playing s1 on islands i.
The dynamics give rise to a Markov process, P, on state space S. From any initial
condition, the system will move to a state or set of states where it remains. Following Young
(1993), such a set will be called a recurrent communication class. The recurrent
communication classes are characterised latter.
Without mutations, the system will move to one of these classes and remain there.
Now assume that each agent mutates independently, with probability e, with the consequence
9that a strategy3 is re-selected at random on their current island. This allows the system to
move between classes and gives rise to the perturbed transition matrix Pe where,
P P cij ij
N
ijk
k
N
k N ke e e e= - + -
=
-å( ) ( )1 12
1
2
2
. (2.1)
Pij  is the ijth element of P, the unperturbed transition Matrix.
Proposition 2.1: Pe has a unique stationary distribution m(e) and lim ( )e me®o  exists and is
equal to one of the stationary distributions of P.
Proof: Young (1993) shows that this is true if Pe is a ‘regular perturbation’ of P. If Pe is a
regular perturbation of P then the following conditions must hold,
i) Pe is aperiodic and irreducible
ii) lime®o  P
e
ij=Pij
iii) Peij >0 for some e implies $ ³ ¥®
-r s t Pr ij0 0 0. . lim .p pe ee
From (2.1) conditions (ii) and (iii) are clearly satisfied. If Peij > 0 then r is 0 if Pij >0 or
equal to the lowest value of k such that cijk >0. We now show that Pe is aperiodic and
irreducible. The diagonal elements of Pe are all positive. This is because in any state, there is a
positive probability that nobody moves and that there are mutations that keep the same
numbers playing each strategy on both islands. Hence Pe is aperiodic. There is a positive
probability of going from any state to the class in which both islands coordinate on the same
equilibrium. This simply requires a certain number of mutations on each island. We can then
                                         
3 All the results go through if we assume a strategy and location is re-selected at random with the restriction
that the capacity constraint cannot be broken. If the number who re-select a location at random would take that
location over its capacity then that island becomes full to capacity and some agents select a strategy at random
on their current island instead.
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have any number of agents on each island up to N(1+d) and for a given number of agents on
each island, we can have any number playing each strategy, as there is a positive probability
that nobody moves while a certain number mutate. It is therefore possible to go from any state
to any other and the process is irreducible. QED.
Definition 2.1: The set of states in the support of lim ( )e m e®o  will be called the long-run
equilibria.
Definition 2.2: A k-tree, h, defined on state space R (the set of recurrent communication
classes), is a set of ordered pairs, (i® j) i, jÎR, such that each state x ¹ k is the initial point
of one arrow and from every state there is a path which leads to k.
Let rij be the minimum number of mutations required to go from class i to j. We know
that such a number exists because Pe is irreducible. The cost of a
k-tree is rij
i j h( )® Î
å .
Proposition 2.2: The long-run equilibria are the set of states in the recurrent communication
class which has the lowest cost k-tree.
For the proof the reader is referred to Young (1993). The intuition is clear. The long-
run equilibria are the set of states in the recurrent communication class that is easiest to flow
into from all other recurrent communication classes. Hence to find the long-run equilibria we
need to characterise the recurrent communication classes and the costs rij of moving between
them and then find the class that has the lowest cost k-tree.
11
Recurrent communication classes.
One recurrent communication class is the set of all sta es where q1 = 2=0. The basin of
attraction of this class is {(q1 , q2 ): q1£ q* , q2£ q* }, since best replies will4 lead both islands
to coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. In this class the system will move between
states where q1 =q2=0 and n1Î(N(1-d), N(1+d)), since agents move with a positive probability
when they are indifferent and n1 must lie in this range due to the capacity constraint.
Now consider any initial condition with q1³ q* and q2£ q* . Best replies will move the
system towards q1 =1 and q2=0. This will result in movement into island 1, since the higher
payoff equilibrium is being played there. The system will eventually move to the equilibrium
state (1,0,N(1+d)). Similarly the set of states with q1£ q* and 2³ q*  form the basin of
attraction of the equilibrium (0,1,N(1-d)). The final possibility is for both populations to
coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. The basin of attraction for this class is
{(q1 , q2 ): q1³ q* , q2³ q* }, and the recurrent communication class is the set of all states with
q1=q2=1 and n1Î(N(1-d), N(1+d)). The four recurrent communication classes are illustrated in
figure 2.2. 
                                         
4When q1 =q* or q2 =q* the dynamics can go either way.
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   Class              Class                       Class                        Class
      1                               2A                                          2B                                              3
               R                                R                               P                                P
Is.1          N(1+d)-N(1-d)                N(1-d)                       N(1+d)              N(1+d)-N(1-d)
                          R                                P                                R                              P
Is.2            N(1+d)-N(1-d)             N(1+d)                      N(1-d)                N(1+d)-N(1-d)
      Figure 2.2. Recurrent communication cl sses:
Row i of circles illustrate the equilibrium played on island i
in each of the classes (risk-dominant, R or payoff-dominant, P),
plus the range of values of ni that are consistent with the class.
       (1-d)q*
1   2
    (1+d)(1- q*)
      2(1-d) q*
1   3
      2(1- q*)
       (1-d) q*
2   3
    (1-d)(1- q*)
Figure 2.3
              Minimum costs of moving between recurrent
                                        communication classes.
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Minimum costs of moving between recurrent communication classes.
Consider the transition from class 1 to 2A. We want the minimum number of mutations
required to get into the basin of attraction of class 2, {(q1 , q2 ): q1³ q* , q2£ q* }, from a state
in class 1, (0,0,n1). Hence we require a proportion q* of island 1 to mutate. Now the less
populated island 1 is, the lower the number of mutations required to achieve this. The
minimum value of n1 is N(1-d) so the minimum number of mutations required is N(1-d) q* .
The dynamics will then move the system to the state (1,0,N(1+d)). The cost of moving back is
N(1+d) (1-q*) since we require the system to move back to a state where q1 £  q* and island 1
is full to capacity.
A direct jump will not necessarily yield the minimum number of mutations. For example consider the
transition from class 1 to 3. A direct jump from class 1 to 3 requires 2Nq* simultaneous mutations. However, it
is easier to go from class 1 to 2 and then from 2 to 3 since this only requires 2(1-d)Nq* mutations. Hence the
minimum number of mutations required to go from class 1 to 3 is 2(1-d)Nq*. All the minimum costs are given
in figure 2.3.
Lemma 1: To find the class which has the minimum cost k-tree it is sufficient to find the
minimum cost trees between just three classes, ruling out either 2A or 2B .
Proof: Let rij denote the minimum cost of the transition i® j.
Then r ri iA B2 2= r rA Bi i2 2= i Î ( , 2 , )1 3 .
Let h be a minimum cost k-tree. Adjust the tree so that at least one of 2A or 2B hav no
predecessors without changing the cost. This is easy to do since i® 2A can b  transferred to
i® 2B (or vice versa) leaving 2A with no predecessors. We can split the adjusted k-tree into
two parts, a minimum cost k/-tree defined on the vertices (1,2,3) and 2A added at minimum
cost. It must be a minimum cost k/-tree because any adjustments which reduce the cost would
also reduce the cost of the k-tree but we started with a minimum cost k-tree. Hence we can
14
find the minimum cost k-tree by first finding the minimum cost k/-tree and then adding a 2-
state at minimum cost. This cost will be common to all k-trees and so does not need to be
considered. QED
This leaves nine trees that we need to compare (3 for each communication class).
These trees are illustrated in table 2.1.
1-trees           2-trees          3-trees
A1:   1 ¬  2 ¬  3 A2:   2 ¬  1 ¬  3 A3:   3 ¬  2 ¬  1
B1:   1 ¬  3 ¬  2 B2:   2 ¬  3 ¬  1 B3:   3 ¬  1 ¬  2
C1:   2 ®  1 ¬  3 C2:   1 ®  2 ¬  3 C3:   2 ®  3 ¬  1
         Table 2.1.
k-trees
Proposition 2.3: The long-run equilibria are:
the set of states in class 1 if d<2q*-1,
and states 2A and 2B if d>2q*-1.
Proof: From proposition 2.2, the long-run equilibria are the set of states in the recurrent
communication class which has the lowest cost k-tree. It is a simple exercise to see that the
lowest cost 1-tree is A1: 1¬2¬3. The other two 1-trees include the transition 1¬3, which
has the same cost as A1 but also include a transition from class 2 at some cost. Similarly, the
lowest cost 3-tree is A3: 3¬2¬1 as the other two 3-trees include the transition 3¬1, which
has the same cost as A3. Finally, the lowest cost 2-tree is C2: 1® 2¬3. The other two
2-trees include the transitions 3® 1 and 1® 3. In each case the cost is reduced by going
directly to class 2.
15
The only difference between the cost of C2 and A3 is in the transition between classes 2
and 3. Since r23>r32 (as q*>
1
2
), C2 always has a lower cost. This leaves two candidates for
minimum cost k-tree, A1 and C2. The cost of A1 is less than the cost of C2 if r21<r12. Hence
class 1 has the lowest cost k-tree if
(1+d)(1-q*) < (1-d)q* => d<2q*-1 (2.1)
If the inequality is reversed then class 2 has the minimum cost k-tree. QED.
The long-run equilibria are illustrated in figure 2.4. Hence the long-run equilibria are
the set of states where everyone plays s2, the risk-dominant strategy if d<2q*-1. The critical
value of d where class 1 becomes the long-run
                                                                       d=2q*-1
          d                                                                                          Key
            1                                                                                 A1 :1             2           3
                                           C2                                                                              C2  :2            1
           3
                                                    A1
                                      0.5                 1                  q*
                                      Figure 2.4
Minimum cost j-trees.
equilibrium increases with the degree of risk-dominance. If d is above this critical value then
class 2 has the minimum cost k-tree. The long-run equilibria are the two states where the two
islands play different equilibria. In fact, from the symmetry of the cost structure, states 2A and
2B will each have a probability of one half in the limit-distribution. It is easy to see why higher
16
values of d upset the risk-dominant equilibrium. In class 2, the island playing the payoff-
dominant equilibrium becomes more populated as d increases because in equilibrium it is full
to capacity. The transition to class 1 therefore becomes more difficult.
By the same token the island playing the risk-dominant equilibrium in class 2 becomes
smaller as d increases and so easier to convert. Hence the transition from class 2 to class 3
where both islands play the payoff-dominant equilibrium becomes easier. However, we never
observe class 3 as the long-run equilibrium. The reason for this is that although the cost of
class 3 is decreasing, the cost of class 2 is also decreasing and is always less. Consider the
minimum costs of the transitions 1® 2 and 3® 2. As d increases the smallest possible size of
an island, (1-d)N, falls. In classes 1 and 3 the transition to a state where one island has a
population size of ((1-d)N) has zero cost. The transition to class 2 then only requires enough
mutations on the small island. The minimum cost therefore falls as d increases.
In Anwar (1998), this model is xtended to the case where there are three locations.
As in the above analysis, the long-run equilibrium remains the state where all islands
coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium when d is sufficiently small. However, if d is
sufficiently high for any given level of risk dominance then the long-run equilibrium involves
the different islands coordinating on different equilibria.
2.2 Inertia in strategy revision.
The previous results rely on the assumption that each agent plays a best reply at their
location. We now extend the model to the case where there is a positive probability that agents
simply continue to use the strategy they used in the previous period. However, if they do
revise their strategy they do so by playing a best reply. As before, there is a positive
probability that they are given the chance to move islands and agents will then choose the
location and strategy that would have maximised their expected payoff in the previous period,
17
as long as this does not involve moving to an island that is full to capacity. One can now think
of the following story underlying these dynamics. At the end of each period the following
events occur with a positive probability for each agent: 1) the agent observes nothing about
the proportions using each strategy, 2) the agent only observes the proportions on his current
island and 3) the agent observes the proportions on both islands. In the first case he simply
continues to use the same strategy in the next period. In the second case he chooses a best
reply on his current island. Finally, in the third case, he will want to move if a best reply on the
other island yields a higher expected payoff than a best reply on his current island. If the island
has spare capacity he will move and play the best reply. If it is full then he plays a best reply on
his current island. The previous models look at the extreme case where the probability of the
first event is zero. In this model the probability of each event is positive.
The state space S, is the same as in the case with no inertia. The above dynamics,
however, give rise to a different transition matrix, P/. All other aspects of the model are the
same. The perturbed transition matrix is given by
P P cij ij
N
ijk
k
N
k N k/ / ( ) ( )e e e e= - + -
=
-å1 12
1
2
2
.
The same reasoning as before can be used to show that P/e is aperiodic and irreducible.
Hence we can apply propositions 2.1 and 2.2 and find the long-run equilibria by finding the
recurrent communication class that has the lowest cost k-tree. The recurrent communication
classes are the same as in the model with no inertia and are illustrated in figure 2.2. However,
the basins of attraction of the recurrent communication classes are now different. This changes
the cost of moving between classes. In the model without inertia, the minimum cost of the
transition 2® 1 is (1+d)(1-q*). We can now achieve this transition with fewer mutations
because after a certain number of mutations on the efficient island, it will be optimal for agents
to move and get a payoff of D. If there are (1-d)(1-q*) mutations followed by movement, then
18
there is a positive probability that 2Nd agents move and that all the agents that move were
playing s1, while nobody revises their strategy on the efficient island. Hence the proportion
playing s1 will be (N(1+d)-2Nd-(1-d)(1-q*)N)/(N(1+d)-2Nd)=q*. However, we must ensure
that it is optimal to move and this requires a proportion (1-q/ ) f the efficient island to mutate,
where q/ satisfies Aq/ +B(1-q/) = D or q/ = (D-B)/(A-B).
Hence
(1- q/)(1+d)N mutations are required before anyone will move. Since the number of mutations
must satisfy both of the above conditions, the minimum number of mutations required will be
max[(1- q/)(1+d),(1-q*(1-d)]. The minimum costs of moving between recurrent
communication classes are given in figure 2.10.
       (1-d)q*
1   2
   max [(1-d)(1- q*) , (1-q/)(1+d)]
      2(1-d) q*
1   3
     (1-d)(1-q*)+ max [(1-d)(1- q*  , (1-q/)(1+d)]
       (1-d) q*
2   3
    (1-d)(1- q*)
Figure 2.10
              Minimum costs of moving between recurrent
                                        communication classes.
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Proposition 2.5: The long-run equilibria are:
all states in class 1 if d< f(q*, q/ )
and states 2A and 2B if d> f(q*, q/ ),
    where f(q*, q/ ) = 
q q
q q
*
*
/
/
+ -
+ -
1
1
.
Proof. From proposition 2.2 we know that we need to find the class with the lowest cost k-
tree. Also to find the class which has the minimum cost k-tree it is sufficient to find the
minimum cost trees between just three classes, ruling out either 2A or 2B (lemma 1). Of the
nine trees (table 2.1), it is a simple exercise to see that the minimum cost tree is either
1® 2¬3 or 1¬2¬35. Hence the set of states in class 1 will be the long-run equilibria when
max[(1-d)(1-q*),(1-q/)(1+d)]<(1-d)q*.
This condition reduces to
(1-q/)(1+d)<(1-d)q*=> d<
q q
q q
*
*
/
/
+ -
+ -
1
1
6.
If the inequality is reversed then class 2 has the minimum cost k-tree. Q.E.D.
The function f(q*, q/ ) is increasing in q* . Apart from the transitions 2® 1 and 3® 1
the minimum costs of moving between recurrent communication classes are the same as the
model with no inertia. Since c21 is smaller than in the earlier case, class 1 has a slightly larger
range over which it is the long-run equilibrium. Otherwise the long-run equilibria are similar -
class 1 if d is below some critical value and class 2 if it is above this value, where the critical
value is increasing with q*.
                                         
5 Any tree that includes the transition 1¬ 3 (or 3¬ 1) cannot be the minimum cost tree because 1¬ 2¬ 3
(or 3¬ 2¬ 1) has the same cost but includes no more transitions. Also 3¬ 2¬ 1 always has a higher cost
than 3® 2¬ 1 because r32<r23 for all values of d.
6 (1-d)(1-q*)< (1-d)q* as q*>1/2.
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2.3 Congestion
One of the interpretations for the capacity constraints given in the introduction is that they are
imposed by local governance to limit congestion. A congestion effect can be introduced
directly into the payoff matrix by subtracting some increasing function of the population size,
f(.), from all the payoffs. We do not want the congestion effect to change the relative
efficiency of the strategies, so we assume,
                                        A-D >f(N(1+d))-f(N(1-d))
With these additional effects, class 1 in the model of section 2.1 reduces to the state
where there is a population of N on each island, (0,0,N). Similarly class 3 reduces to the state,
(1,1,N). The four recurrent  communication classes are 4 single states. However, the costs of
moving between the classes is almost identical to the costs given in figure 2.3. The only
significant difference is that to go from class 1 to class 2 requires (1-d)q*N+1 mutations. After
one mutation, agents move away from the location where the mutation has occurred. This will
leave (1-d)N on the island where the mutation occurred and a proportion q* of those that
remain must mutate to convert it. Hence condition 2.1 now becomes,
d<2q*-1+1/N. (2.2)
Hence for large N the condition is almost the same. The above result relies on one mutation
followed by mass movement and this is because strategy revision was assumed to be
instantaneous in section 2.1. In the case where there is inertia in strategy revision the
reasoning and results of section 2.2 follow exactly. The congestion effect makes no difference
whatsoever.
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2.4 No capacity constraints.
We now consider the consequences of removing the capacity constraints altogether.
To do this it is necessary to make some assumptions on what happens when an island becomes
empty. We begin by looking at the case where there is no congestion effect. If we assume that
the payoff of being alone at a location is less than D then there are 4 equilibrium states, all of
which involve an empty island7. To ensure the perturbed process is irreducible, we only
consider the case where agents choose a strategy and location at random when they mutate8.
Only one mutation is required to move from an equilibrium where everyone plays s2 to one
where everyone plays s1 but to move in the reverse direction requires 2N(1-q*) mutations.
Clearly the long-run equilibria are the two states where one island is empty and the other one
plays the efficient equilibrium. The empty location plays a coordinating role.
The story is slightly different if there is a congestion effect, as there are two further
equilibria to consider, (1,1,N) and (0,0,N). In the first both islands coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium and in the second both coordinate on the risk-dominant one with the population
evenly spread in each case. Call these states A and B respectively. We can simplify the analysis
by allowing for a small degree of anticipation. When an island is empty an agent may move to
it and play the efficient strategy anticipating the fact that others will follow onto the less
congested island. Hence the states where one island is empty now form part of the basin of
attraction of state A and there are only two equilibrium states, A and B. To move from state A
to state B requires 2N(1-q*) mutations as we need both islands to convert to the risk-
dominant equilibrium. To move from B to A only requires one mutation as agents will move
away from the location where the mutation has occurred moving the system into the basin of
                                         
7When the islands are playing different equilibria, then everyone will move to the efficient one. When they are
playing the same equilibrium, then one island will eventually become empty without mutations as agents move
with a positive probability when they are indifferent.
8 Otherwise once an island becomes empty it remains empty.
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attraction of the efficient equilibrium. Hence the only difference with the case where there is
no congestion effect is that in equilibrium there is no empty location, the population is evenly
spread.
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3. Conclusions
Kandori et al and Young have developed techniques for characterising the limit of the
stationary distribution when the mutation rate goes to zero. This allows us to address the
question of equilibrium selection in the long-run when the mutation rate is very small. Using
these techniques they show that the equilibrium selected is the risk-dominant one rather than
the efficient one.
The results of the capacity constrained, local interaction model essentially show that
the introduction of movement may upset the long-run equilibrium where everyone plays the
risk-dominant strategy, but will not necessarily lead to a long-run equilibrium where everyone
plays the efficient one. The alternatives are states in which some islands coordinate on the
efficient equilibrium and others on the risk-dominant one. These equilibria are observed when
there are binding capacity constraints. However, risk-dominance still has a role to play in the
determination of the long-run equilibria. The important feature is the degree of risk-dominance
which will determine how lax the capacity constraint needs to be before the long-run equilibria
switch from purely risk-dominant to the mixture of equilibria. When the capacity constraints
are relaxed altogether the long-run equilibria involve everyone playing the efficient strategy.
Hence when agents are able to move between locations, the state in which everyone
plays the risk-dominant strategy is no longer the unique long-run equilibrium. However,
results that show that movement leads to a unique long-run equilibrium where everyone plays
the efficient strategy rely on spare capacity. In fact, with binding capacity constraints, the
long-run equilibria will depend on the degree of risk-dominance and the strictness of the
capacity constraints.
On a more practical level, the results show that imposing restrictions on movement
hinders efficiency. The capacity constraints result in at least one location coordinating on the
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inefficient equilibrium, and when the constraint is sufficiently strong, on both locations
coordinating on the inefficient equilibrium. When the capacity constraints arise because of
physical restrictions, there is potentially a gain to be made by expanding capacity at each
location. The gain from efficiency would have to be balanced against the cost of expanding
capacity.
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